Abstract. We study the ergodicity of deterministic two-person zero-sum differential games. This property is defined by the uniform convergence to a constant of either the infinite-horizon discounted value as the discount factor tends to zero, or equivalently, the averaged finite-horizon value as the time goes to infinity. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the unique ergodicity of a game. This notion extends the classical one for dynamical systems, namely when ergodicity holds with any (suitable) perturbation of the running payoff function. Our main condition is symmetric between the two players and involve dominions, i.e., subsets of states that one player can make approximately invariant.
Introduction
We study the ergodic problem for deterministic two-player zero-sum differential games. Such games are defined by a nonlinear system in R n controlled by two players,Ẋ t = f (X t , a t , b t ), X 0 = x. Given a continuous and bounded payoff function ℓ, the players intend to optimize -minimize for the first player, who chooses the controls a t ∈ A, and maximize for the second player, who chooses the controls b t ∈ B -one of the following payoff functionals: for the game played in finite horizon t. We assume that the data are Z n -periodic in the state variable x ∈ R n so that the state space can be identify with the n-torus R n /Z n . We also restrict our study to the lower game, in which player 1 adapts her control to player 2's action, but all the results can be readily adapted to the upper game or the situation in which the classical Isaacs condition holds.
The value of the discounted or finite-horizon (lower) game, denoted respectively by v δ (x) and v(t, x), is the equilibrium payoff and can be characterized as the viscosity solution of, respectively, the stationary Hamilton-Jacobi PDE (partial differential equation) δu(x) + H(x, Du(x)) = 0 or the evolutionary PDE ∂ t u(t, x) + H(x, Du(t, x)) = 0 with boundary condition u(0, x) = 0. In these equations, H refers to the Hamiltonian of the (lower) game, defined by H(x, p) = min The ergodic problem for zero-sum differential games or for Hamilton-Jacobi equations, its PDE counterpart, concerns the asymptotic behavior of the value functions v δ (x) and v(t, x). More precisely, it deals with the uniform convergence toward a constant of δv δ (x) when the discount factor δ goes to zero, and of v(t, x)/t when the horizon t goes to infinity. The problem has been much studied since the seminal work of Lions, Papanicolaou and Varadhan [LPV87] . To remain concise, let us just mention few papers with which this work is related: Arisawa [Ari97, Ari98] for optimal control (i.e., one-player) problems, Alvarez and Bardi [AB03, AB07] or Cardaliaguet [Car10] for two-player games. The literature on the subject is vast and we let the interested reader find more references in the latter articles.
Whether we consider the value of a game or the solution of an Hamilton-Jacobi PDE, it was proved that, under standard assumptions on the data, an AbelianTauberian property holds, that is, if one of the above-mentioned uniform limit exists and is constant, then the other limit also exists and is equal to the same ergodic constant, see e.g., [Ari98] for optimal control and [AL98] for stochastic control, or [AB03] for general second-order Hamilton-Jacobi equations. We further mention that the ergodicity property of the (lower) game implies that the game with long time average payoff (also called ergodic payoff) J ∞ (x, a, b) = lim inf t→+∞ 1 t t 0 ℓ(X s , a s , b s )ds also has a value which is equal to the ergodic constant, see [AB07] .
An important problem is then to characterize the differential games which are ergodic. Typical results assume that the nonlinear system (or a subsystem, if it is decomposable) is uniformly controllable by one player, that is, any point x is controllable to any other point y by this player, either exactly or approximately, asymptotically or in bounded time, see e.g., [Ari98, Bet05, AB07] . Such conditions are independent of the payoff function ℓ and thus imply that the games are in fact uniquely ergodic. This notion, which was originally defined for dynamical systems, readily extends to differential games: a game is uniquely ergodic if it is ergodic for all perturbations of the payoff function ℓ that only depend on the state variable. In [Ari97] , Arisawa showed that a converse property holds for systems controlled by one player and proved the existence of an ergodic attractor when unique ergodicity holds. But for two-player games, these controllability conditions totally lack of symmetry and focus only on one player.
The purpose of this article is to study this property of unique ergodicity for differential games. We introduce a "dominion condition" which is in essence symmetrical between the two players. A dominion is associated with one player and, roughly speaking, corresponds to a nonempty subset of states that this player can make approximately invariant for the dynamics. We show that if a game is uniquely ergodic, then the players do not have disjoint dominions. To prove this result, we use an Hamilton-Jacobi PDE approach. Under specific controllability assumptions (independence of f with respect to the state variable or uniform time estimates on the dynamics) we further prove that the "dominion condition" is in fact equivalent to unique ergodicity. Thus our results generalize the unique ergodicity property of dynamical systems (we refer to [AB03, Sec. 6 .1] for the connections between classical ergodic theory and ergodicity of games or Hamiltonians), as well as the analysis of Arisawa in [Ari97, Ari98] for optimal control problems. Let us further observe that if a system is uniformly controllable by one player, then, whatever assumptions are made on the controllability (asymptotic or bounded time, exact or approximate), it implies that the other player has a unique trivial dominion, namely the whole state space, and so that the "dominion condition" trivially holds.
We finally mention that the notion of dominion is very similar to the one of leadership and discriminating domain in viability theory, see e.g., [Car96] . However, the ideas developed in this article are inspired by he study of zero-sum repeated games (i.e., games played in discrete time), for which they were successfully applied to the equivalent ergodic problem, see the companion works [Hoc19] and [AGH19] .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is dedicated to preliminaries on differential games, their value functions and the Hamilton-Jacobi PDE approach to ergodicity. In Section 3, we study the unique ergodicity property for general Hamiltonians (i.e., not necessarily associated with a differential game), that is, the property of an Hamiltonian to be ergodic for any suitable perturbation. This (slightly) generalizes a characterization by Alvarez and Bardi in [AB10] . In Section 4 we introduce the notion of dominion and establish some characterizations. Finally, in Section 5, we study the unique ergodicity property for differential games, first following the PDE approach and then by a dynamical system approach.
Preliminaries
2.1. Framework and standing assumptions. We start by describing the setting of a deterministic two-player zero-sum differential games that we study in this article. We first consider the following nonlinear system in R n controlled by two players:
(1)
where the map f : R n ×A×B → R n , with A, B nonempty compact metric spaces, is continuous in all variables and Lipschitz continuous in the state variable, uniformly in the control variables, i.e., denoting by |·| the standard Euclidean norm,
for some constant L f 0 and for all x, y ∈ R n , a ∈ A and b ∈ B. Player 1 (resp., player 2) chooses a control t → a t (resp., t → b t ) in the set of Lebesgue measurable functions from [0, +∞) to A (resp., B), which we denote by A (resp., B). -In order to simplify the notation, we shall equally denote by a and b single elements of A and B, respectively, and controls of player 1 and player 2, i.e., elements of A and B, respectively. -The Cauchy-Lipschitz theorem implies that Equation (1) has a unique solution, which we denote by X x,a,b t and for which the differential equation holds for almost all t > 0.
Carrying on with the definition of a game, we are also given a bounded and continuous payoff function ℓ : R n × A × B → R (we let M ℓ = ℓ ∞ , the supremum norm of ℓ). Then, for any trajectory of the controlled system (1), we mainly consider the following payoff functional, which is associated with the game played in infinite horizon with a discount rate δ ∈ (0, 1) on the running payoff:
The objective of player 1 is to minimize the latter quantity, whereas player 2 intends to maximize it. We shall also briefly mention the payoff functional associated with the game played in a finite horizon t > 0:
Throughout the paper we make the following assumption. Let us recall beforehand that a modulus is a nondecreasing function ω : [0, +∞) → [0, +∞), vanishing and continuous at 0, that is, such that lim r→0 ω(r) = ω(0) = 0.
The payoff function ℓ is uniformly continuous with respect to the state variable, uniformly with respect to the control variables, i.e., there exists a modulus ω ℓ such that
(ii) The functions f and ℓ are Z n -periodic in the state variable, i.e., for ϕ ∈ {f, ℓ},
Let us remark that Item (ii) implies that the state space can be identify with the n-torus R n /Z n . Although we shall work mostly in R n , we draw the attention of the reader to the fact that sometimes we will consider objects in the quotient space. Moreover, Item (ii) together with the continuity of f entails the boundedness of this function. We therefore let M f = f ∞ .
2.2.
Value functions and Hamilton-Jacobi equations. We introduce here the concept of value function and then characterize it in terms of viscosity solution of some Hamilton-Jacobi equation. We keep the presentation to a minimum and refer the reader to the classical monograph [BCD97] , for instance, for more details.
Let us start with the definition of nonanticipating strategies.
Definition 2.1 (Nonanticipating strategy). A nonanticipating strategy for the first player is a map α : B → A such that for any time t > 0 and any controls
] s for almost all s t. We denote by A the set of nonanticipating strategies for player 1.
The set B of nonanticipating strategies β : A → B for the second player is defined accordingly.
We then introduce the (unnormalized) value functions. When player 2 chooses a control b ∈ B and player 1 is allowed to adapt her response to this control, i.e., when she chooses a nonanticipating strategy α ∈ A , we speak of the lower game, which we denote by Γ − , and the lower value function associated with the infinite-horizon discounted payoff functional is defined by
On the other hand, if player 1 is bound to choose a control a ∈ A to which player 2 can adapt by choosing a nonanticipating strategy β ∈ B, then we speak of the upper game, denoted by Γ + , and the upper value function is given by
When the game is played in a finite horizon t > 0, the value functions are defined similarly by, respectively,
We always have v
) and the differential game is said to have a value at state x if there is equality. The latter holds under the classical Isaacs condition (which we recall at the end of the section). However, in this work, we do not need to make such an assumption: all the results presented in the article hold in the lower as well as in the upper game. Owing to the symmetry of Γ − and Γ + , we shall only consider from now on the lower game, and therefore drop the "-" superscript for simplicity of the notation. We leave to the reader the straightforward adaptation of the results to the upper game (or to the situation in which Isaacs' condition holds).
We readily deduce from the above definitions that the normalized value functions x → δv δ (x) and (t, x) → v(t, x)/t are bounded by M ℓ and Z n -periodic. It is also known that they are respectively (uniformly) continuous on R n and Lipschitz continuous on [0, T ] × R n for all times T > 0. Furthermore, they can be characterized as viscosity solutions of some partial differential equations (PDEs for short), called Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs' equations. The latter involve the (lower) Hamiltonian, defined by
where ·, · is the standard scalar product on R n . We mention that in this paper, the solutions of PDEs will always be in the continuous viscosity sense. Moreover, given any real function (t, x) → ϕ(t, x), we will denote by ∂ t ϕ its partial derivative with respect to the time variable t, and by Dϕ its gradient with respect to the state variable x. Theorem 2.2. Under all the above assumptions on f and ℓ, the value function v δ is the unique continuous viscosity solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation
and the value function (t, x) → v(t, x) is the unique continuous viscosity solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation
The upper value functions are characterized by the same PDEs after replacing the lower Hamiltonian H with the upper Hamiltonian
Consequently, if Isaacs' condition holds, that is, if
then the lower and the upper value functions are equal.
2.3. Ergodicity and PDE approach. In this article, we are interested in the asymptotic behavior of the value functions, that is, in the behavior of v δ (x) as the discount rate δ goes to 0 (resp., of v(t, x) as the time horizon t goes to +∞). More specifically, we study the so-called ergodic problem, that is, the situation in which there exists a constant λ ∈ R such that the normalized value δv δ (x) tends to λ as δ goes to 0 (resp., v(t, x)/t tends to λ as t goes to +∞) uniformly in x. This property is called ergodicity of the game. Thanks to the characterization theorem 2.2, the latter problem can be studied by a PDE approach. With this in mind, we shall sometimes consider arbitrary Hamiltonians (x, p) → H(x, p) defined on R n × R n that satisfy the following properties. Note that these properties are inherited from the Hamiltonian defined in (2).
n -periodic in the first variable, i.e, for all x, p ∈ R n and k ∈ Z n ,
(iv) There is a function H ∞ : R n ×R n → R that is positively homogeneous of degree one in the second variable, and a constant M H 0 such that, for all x, p ∈ R n ,
Let us make few comments about these assumptions. First, Items (i) to (iii) imply that the PDEs (HJ δ ) and (HJ t ) have a unique continuous viscosity solution. In particular, Item (iii) implies that the comparison principle for viscosity solutions holds. Second, the map H ∞ introduced in Item (iv) is called the recession function of H. The positive homogeneity of degree one means that
for all x, p ∈ R n and all ν > 0. A consequence is that
uniformly in (x, p), and so H ∞ is necessarily unique, continuous and Z n -periodic in the first variable. Let us observe that if H is the Hamiltonian associated with the lower game Γ − , as defined in (2), then
Following a PDE approach, the existence and the value of the ergodic constant λ defined above can be related with the viscosity solutions of the following cell problem:
The next result explains this connection. In its statement, we abbreviate upper semicontinuous as u.s.c. and lower semicontinuous as l.s.c. Note that the result which appears in [AB03] was shown for second-order Hamilton-Jacobi PDEs. formly in x to a constant λ 2 ∈ R as t goes to +∞. (iii) There exists a constant λ 3 such that sup {c ∈ R | there is an u.s.c. subsolution of (CP)} = λ 3 = inf {c ∈ R | there is a l.s.c. supersolution of (CP)} .
Moreover, if one of the above assertion is true, then λ 1 = λ 2 = λ 3 .
When an arbitrary Hamiltonian H satisfies one (hence all) of the above assertions, we say that it is ergodic. We refer the reader to [AB03, Sec. 6] for a detailed discussion on the connections between classical ergodic theory of deterministic dynamical systems and ergodicity of Hamiltonians.
Unique ergodicity of Hamiltonians
In this section, we introduce the central concept of this article, namely unique ergodicity, which we first apply to arbitrary Hamiltonians.
Unique ergodicity is a property that originally applies to dynamical systems. Although its definition (existence of a unique invariant probability measure) cannot be readily extended to differential games or a fortiori to arbitrary Hamiltonians, it is its characterization in terms of constant long time averages of any continuous function along the trajectories that makes this extension possible.
Alvarez and Bardi in [AB10] used this terminology of unique ergodicity and studied the property for two-player controlled systems. However, we mention that before this work, the property was already studied for controlled systems, although without being given any explicit name, see for instance [Ari97, Ari98] .
3.1. Definition and characterization.
Definition 3.1 (Uniquely ergodic Hamiltonian). Let H : R n × R n → R be an Hamiltonian satisfying Items (i) to (iii) in Assumption A 1 . We say that H is uniquely ergodic if, for every continuous and Z n -periodic function g : R n → R, the perturbed Hamiltonian g + H is ergodic, i.e., one (hence all) of the assertions in Theorem 2.3 holds with g + H.
In the remainder, we denote by C 0 per (R n ) the space of continuous and Z n -periodic real functions over R n .
We next give a characterization of unique ergodicity which is very similar to Proposition 2.3 in [AB10] -as a matter of fact, most of the proof is borrowed from the latter reference, which we have chosen to reproduce for the sake of completeness. However, our result differs from the one of Alvarez and Bardi in two ways. First, it is not restricted to Hamiltonians associated with differential games but it applies to arbitrary Hamiltonians. Second, our definition of unique ergodicity is slightly more general, in the sense that we only need to consider perturbations of Hamiltonians of the form g ∈ C 0 per (R n ). • (Structural equicontinuity) for every continuous and Z n -periodic function g : R n → R, if u δ denotes the solution of (HJ δ ) with the Hamiltonian g + H, then the family {δu δ } 0<δ 1 is equicontinuous;
• (Strong maximum principle) the constant functions are the only continuous viscosity solutions of the PDE
where H ∞ is the recession function of H.
Proof. Let us first assume that H is uniquely ergodic. Let g ∈ C 0 per (R n ) and, for δ ∈ (0, 1], let u δ be the solution of (HJ δ ) with the Hamiltonian g + H. Since g + H satisfies Assumption A 1 , the standard comparison principle for viscosity solutions holds and a straightforward application of it yields first that the family {δu δ } 0<δ 1 is uniformly bounded by M g = g(·) + H(·, 0) ∞ and then, using this fact, that
The solution of (HJ δ ) being continuous, we deduce that the function (δ, x) → δu δ (x) is continuous on (0, 1] × R n . Together with the hypothesis that δu δ (x) converges uniformly in x to a constant when δ goes to 0, it entails the equicontinuity of {δu δ } 0<δ 1 .
To show that the second point (strong maximum principle) holds, let us consider any continuous viscosity solution w of (HJ ∞ ). Fix ρ > 0 and denote by u ρ δ the solution of (HJ δ ) with the Hamiltonian −ρw + H, i.e., the solution of
Let us show that w
where M H is the constant defined in Item (iv) of Assumption A 1 for the Hamiltonian H, is a viscosity subsolution of (5). To that purpose, for any x ∈ R n , let us consider any continuously differentiable function ϕ such that w ρ δ − ϕ has a local maximum point at x. Then the function w − δ ρ ϕ has also a local maximum at x, which implies that H ∞ (x, δ ρ Dϕ(x)) 0. The positive homogeneity of H ∞ yields H ∞ (x, Dϕ(x)) 0. We then have
This proves that w ρ δ is a viscosity subsolution of (5) at any x. Since w hence w ρ δ is continuous, the comparison principle applies, leading to w
Similarly, we can show that 1 δ (ρw + M H ) is a viscosity supersolution of (5), hence that u ρ δ 1 δ (ρw + M H ). Since H is uniquely ergodic, we know that δu ρ δ converges to some constant λ ρ when δ goes to 0. Thus, passing to the limit in the latter inequalities, we get
for all x, y ∈ R n and all ρ > 0, which yields
Letting ρ goes to +∞, we obtain that w(x) − w(y) 0 for all x, y ∈ R n , hence that w is constant. This concludes the necessary part of the proof.
We now prove the sufficient part and assume that the structural equicontinuity property and the strong maximum principle hold true. Let g be any function in C 0 per (R n ) and denote by u δ the solution of Equation (HJ δ ) with g + H. We have already mentionned at the beginning of the proof that the family {δu δ } 0<δ 1 is uniformly bounded. Since it is also equicontinuous by hypothesis, the Arzelà-Ascoli theorem entails the existence of a subsequence that converges uniformly to some continuous and Z n -periodic function w. Multiplying (HJ δ ) by δ, we get that the function δu δ solves in R n the equation
with u being Z n -periodic. Since (x, r, p) → δr + δg(x) + δH(x, δ −1 p) converges as δ goes to 0 to (x, r, p) → H ∞ (x, p) locally uniformly in R n × R × R n , the stability property of viscosity solutions yields that the uniform limit w is solution of (HJ ∞ ), hence constant since the strong maximum principle applies. We then deduce that Item (iii) of Theorem 2.3 is satisfied. Indeed the implication (i) ⇒ (iii) remains true if, instead of the whole family {δu δ }, there is only a subsequence of {δu δ } that converges uniformly to a constant (for the details, see the proof of [AB03, Thm. 4]). Thus the Hamiltonian g +H is ergodic which proves that H is uniquely ergodic.
By adapting the proof with the following weaker hypothesis, we can also get a sufficient condition of ergodicity.
Proposition 3.3. Let H be an arbitrary Hamiltonian satisfying Assumption A 1 . If the family {δu δ } 0<δ 1 , where u δ is the solution of (HJ δ ), is equicontinuous and if the strong maximum principle holds, then H is ergodic.
Example 3.4. Consider a differential game with state space in R 2 whose dynamics is defined for all x ∈ R 2 by
with 0 < γ 1. Then, as we shall see in the next section (see Example 3.6), for any payoff function ℓ satisfying Assumption A 0 , the family of value functions {δv δ } 0<δ 1 is equicontinuous. On the other hand, the recession operator of the Hamiltonian of the game is
and we know that (HJ ∞ ) has a nonconstant solution if and only if γ ∈ Q (see e.g., [Car10] ). Thus, the game is ergodic if γ is irrational.
3.2. Equicontinuity of {δu δ }. Theorem 3.2 and Proposition 3.3 tell us that (unique) ergodicity relies on two distinct properties. As we shall see in Section 5, the strong maximum principle is a qualitative feature of the underlying dynamical system, which can be systematically characterized. On the other hand, the (structural) equicontinuity property appears more difficult to apprehend and is rather related with quantitative aspects of the underlying dynamics (e.g., controllability assumptions with specific time estimates). We next review two sufficient conditions on any Hamiltonian H that guarantee the equicontinuity of the family {δu δ }. Let us mention that for both conditions, the equicontinuity property is stable by perturbations of H with functions g ∈ C 0 per (R n ), that is, equicontinuity is "structural" (in the sense of Theorem 3.2).
The first of these conditions is a classic: it is well known that equicontinuity of {δu δ } holds if H is coercive in the second variable, i.e., lim |p|→+∞ H(x, p) = +∞ uniformly in x. More precisely, this property implies that the family {u δ } is uniformly Lipschitz continuous. This yields in particular the existence of a corrector, that is, a solution to (CP), see [LPV87] .
Secondly, the equicontinuity property holds if H is uniformly continuous in x, uniformly with respect to p, i.e., there exists a modulus ω such that
for all x, y ∈ R n and all p ∈ R n . Indeed, the equicontinuity of {δu δ } can be readily shown via the comparison principle, after noticing that u δ (· + h) − δ −1 ω(|h|) and u δ (· + h) + δ −1 ω(|h|) are respectively subsolution and supersolution of (HJ δ ) (see [Car10] ).
Example 3.5. Assume that H(x, p) = H(p)−l(x), where the function H : R n → R is continuous andl : R n → R is continuous and Z n -periodic. Then H satisfies (6), hence the structural equicontinuity property holds.
Example 3.6. Assume that H is the Hamiltonian of a deterministic zero-sum differential game Γ − for which the function f that controls the dynamics only depends on the control variables but not on the state, that is, f (x, a, b) =f (a, b) for some continuous functionf : A × B → R n and for all x. Then H writes
and one can easily see that it satisfies condition (6) with modulus ω ℓ . Thus the structural equicontinuity property holds. Observe that if ℓ(x, a, b) =l(x) for all x, a, b and somel ∈ C 0 per (R n ), then we recover as a special case the previous example.
Dominions
We introduce in this section the main tool of this article, namely dominions, which we shall use to characterize unique ergodicity of differential games. Informally speaking, dominions are subsets of state that can be made approximately invariant by one player for an arbitrary period of time. This is an adaptation to the framework of differential games of a notion that was used to study zero-sum repeated games (played in discrete time), see in particular the companion works [AGH19, Hoc19] . However, as we shall prove, the notion coincides with the one of leadership domain and discriminating domain which appears in viability theory (see, e.g., [Car96] ).
4.1. Definition and operator-theoretic characterization. Before giving the formal definition of a dominion, let us recall that we are considering a deterministic zero-sum differential game in its lower from Γ − and that we denote by H its Hamiltonian (2). With the aim of simplifying the notation, we shall hereafter write X , the solution of the controlled system (1) induced by a strategy α ∈ A of player 1 and a control b ∈ B of player 2. Also, we let dist K (x) be the distance of a point x ∈ R n to a subset K ⊂ R n , that is, 
Dominions for the second player are defined accordingly. Specifically, a dominion of player 2 in Γ − is a nonempty closed set D ⊂ R n such that
In the next results, we characterize dominions of player 1 and player 2 in operatortheoretic terms. These characterizations stem from the similarities that exist between dominions on the one hand, and the interpretation of discriminating and leadership domains which appear in viability theory, on the other hand. Indeed, the latter, which are defined by means of inequalities involving H ∞ , can also be characterized in terms of invariant dynamics (see, e.g., [Car96] ). This correspondence between the two notions can be readily established for leadership domains and dominions of player 2 in the lower game (see Theorem 2.3, ibid.). As for the correspondence between discriminating domains and dominions of player 1, it is not as straightforward since the interpretation theorem (Theorem 2.1, ibid.) requires convexity properties. Such assumptions (typically, A is convex and f is affine in a) are commonly assumed in viability theory but are not needed here. Nevertheless, by adapting the proof of the latter result to our setting, we are able to show that dominions of the first player in Γ − can indeed be characterized as discriminating domains. We next state precisely these results.
To that purpose, we need to introduce the following definition. A vector p ∈ R n is a proximal normal to a subset K of R n at point x ∈ K if dist K (x + p) = |p|. We denote by NP K (x) the set of proximal normals to K at x. Note that, if we let P K z be the set of projections of any point z ∈ R n onto K, i.e., then the definition of a proximal normal implies that for every p ∈ NP K (x) and every ν ∈ (0, 1), we have P K (x+νp) = {x}. Let us also recall the following standard estimates on the trajectories of (1) (where f ∞ = M f ):
for all x, y ∈ R n , a ∈ A, b ∈ B and t 0. The following operator-theoretic characterization of dominions of player 2 in Γ − comes from the correspondence of the latter with leadership domains in viability theory. 
We next give a similar characterization for dominions of player 1, this time coming from their interpretation as discriminating domains. Proof. We first prove the necessary part and suppose that D is a dominion of player 1. Toward a contradiction, let us assume that there exists a positive constant η, some x ∈ D and some p ∈ NP D (x) such that
Since the function b → min a∈A f (x, a, b), p is upper semicontinuous and B is compact, there exists an actionb ∈ B such that
Let b ∈ B be the constant control equal tob, i.e., b t =b for all t 0. Since D is a dominion of player 1, given ε > 0 and T > 0 there exists a strategy α ∈ A such that dist D (X ε for all t ∈ [0, T ]. In order to simplify the notation, let X t = X . Then, for all t ∈ [0, T ], choosing any point y t in P D X t , the set of projections of X t on D, we have
where we use the fact that y t ∈ D and that |x
On the other hand, for almost all t ∈ [0, T ] we have 1 2
To establish the last inequality, we used the estimate (7); the Lipschitz continuity of f (with Lipschitz constant L f ); and (9). Let
After integrating the latter inequality we get, for all t ∈ [0, T ],
which, combined with (10), yields
Note that to square (10), we need to assume that ε |p|, which is possible because p is different from 0 (otherwise (9) would not hold). In the latter inequality, the positive constants |p|, C and η are fixed, whereas ε and T are arbitrary. Hence, by choosing T = η/C and rewriting (11) with t = T we obtain
which is a contradiction if ε is small enough. This concludes the proof of the necessary part. We now prove the sufficient part and assume that for all points x in D and all proximal normals p in NP D (x), we have (12) max
We then fix x ∈ D and positive constants ε and T . Our aim is to construct recursively on the subintervals [t k , t k+1 ) of a well-chosen partition ) ε for all t ∈ [0, T ] and all controls b of player 2. The mesh θ = T N of the partition (which shall depend only on x, ε, T and the data of the problem) will be chosen a posteriori, so we assume for now that it is fixed. Also, for any z ∈ R n we shall fix a point in P D z which we denote by p D (z).
We start by selecting an arbitrary elementā in A and set α[b] t =ā for all b ∈ B and t ∈ [0, t 1 ). Note that α is obviously nonanticipating on [0, t 1 ), that is, for any controls b 1 , b 2 ∈ B that coincide almost everywhere on [0, t 1 ), we have
] t for (almost) all t ∈ [0, t 1 ). Next we assume that α has been defined on [0, t k ) with 0 < k < N and that it is nonanticipating on this interval. Given any control b ∈ B, if X x,α,b t k ∈ D, then we set α[b] t =ā on [t k , t k+1 ). Otherwise, letting X k = X x,α,b t k (for simplicity) and y k = p D (X k ), we introduce the set-valued map Φ defined from B to A by To conclude the proof, it remains to show that dist D (X . We also let X k = X t k and y k = p D (X k ). For all k ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} and for almost all t ∈ [t k , t k+1 ] we have 1 2
To establish the latter inequality, we used the estimate (7) and the fact that either
Remark 4.4. The definition and the characterization of dominions in the upper game Γ + are identical after switching the identity of the players (the fact that one is minimizing and the other maximizing does not come into account). In particular, Theorem 4.3 and the classical min-max inequality yield that a dominion of player 1 in Γ + is also a dominion in Γ − . Similarly, using Theorem 4.2, a dominion of player 2 in Γ − is also a dominion in Γ + . These observations are consistent with the fact that each player has more information in one game than in the other (Γ − for player 1, Γ + for player 2), hence has an advantage in this game. Furthermore, note that when Isaacs' condition (3) applies to H ∞ , then each player has the same dominions in the lower and the upper game.
Example 4.5. Consider the game already introduced in Example 3.4, whose controlled system is defined in R 2 by the function
with 0 < γ 1 (and with any payoff function ℓ satisfying Assumption A 0 ). Let us observe that Isaacs' condition holds for H ∞ :
Hence, according to the above remark, the dominions are the same in the lower and the upper game. Therefore, in order to describe them, whatever the game (lower or upper) we are considering, we can use their simplest definition for each player, namely for player 1: dominions as defined in Γ − ; for player 2: dominions as defined in Γ + . Following this observation, we can easily see that any line of the form We give here an alternative characterization of dominions which we will use late later. Given a subset K ⊂ R n , we denote by K ε the set of points whose distance to K is not greater than ε > 0, i.e.,
Also, we denote by 1 K the indicator function of K, defined by 1 K (x) = 1 if x ∈ K and 1 K (x) = 0 if x / ∈ K. We now assume that D is not a dominion of player 1. Since it is nonempty, it means that there exist somex ∈ D, ε > 0 and T > 0 such that for all strategies α of player 1, player 2 can choose a control b for which Xx
Using the estimate (7) we deduce that 
which concludes the proof.
With a minor adaptation of the proof, which we leave to the reader, we can show a dual characterization of dominions for the second player. 
Reachable sets.
We identify here specific classes of dominions, which shall appear later in the article. Let us first start by introducing these sets. Given any strategy α ∈ A of player 1, we define the reachable set from a point x ∈ R n for player 2 by
On the other hand, for all strategies α ∈ A of player 1, let us associate a control b α ∈ B of player 2. Then, we define the reachable set from x ∈ R n for player 1 by
Furthermore, we say that the map α → b α is nonanticipating if
That is, if α 1 and α 2 coincide almost surely on [0, t], then the same is true for b α 1 and b α 2 .
We then have the following result.
Lemma 4.9. Given a strategy α ∈ A of player 1, the topological closure of the reachable set from any point x ∈ R n for player 2, R 1 α (x), is a dominion of player 1. Dually, given a map α → b α from A to B which is nonanticipating, the closure of the reachable set from x for player 1, R 2 b(·) (x), is a dominion of player 2.
Proof. We show in detail that R 1 α (x) is a dominion of player 1, and leave to the reader the details of the proof for R 2 b(·) (x), which follows the same lines. Nevertheless we will highlight the important changes.
First, for any point y ∈ R 1 α (x), we show that we can construct a strategyᾱ ∈ A of player 1 such that X 
Thus, for all b ∈ B and s ∈ [0, T ] we have dist R 1 α (x) (X z,ᾱ,b s ) ε, which finally proves that R 1 α (x) is a dominion for player 1. For R 2 b(·) (x) the proof is identical, up to the changes in players' role. The main difference concerns the construction, for any point y ∈ R 2 b(·) (x) and any strategy α ∈ A of player 1, of a controlb ∈ B of player 2 such that X y,α,b s ∈ R 2 b(·) (x) for all s 0. We next detail this construction. Letᾱ ∈ A and t 0 be such that
. Let us also define, for any b ∈ B, the control σ t b by (σ t b) s = b s+t . We then define a nonanticipating strategyᾱ|α as follows:
If we setb = σ t bᾱ |α , one can check that X
Unique ergodicity of differential games
In this final section, we define the notion of unique ergodicity for zero-sum differential games and provide necessary and sufficient conditions. In the whole section, we fix a deterministic zero-sum differential game in its lower form Γ − . As usual, the operator H refers to the Hamiltonian (2) of the game and H ∞ to its recession operator (4).
5.1. Definition and necessary condition. We start by introducing the notions of ergodicity and unique ergodicity for differential games.
Definition 5.1 (Ergodicity of differential games). The differential game Γ
− is ergodic if the normalized value δv δ (x) converges uniformly in x to a constant when δ goes to 0 (or equivalently if v(t, x)/t converges uniformly to a constant when t goes to +∞).
The game Γ − is uniquely ergodic if for every continuous and Z n -periodic function g : R n → R, the perturbed game with running payoff (x, a, b) → ℓ(x, a, b) + g(x), all other data being equal, is ergodic.
We know from the characterization of v δ (·) or v(t, ·) as viscosity solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs PDEs (Theorem 2.2) that the game Γ − is (uniquely) ergodic if and only if its Hamiltonian H is (see Section 3). Hence Theorem 3.2 already provides conditions of unique ergodicity. The purpose of this section is to give other conditions which involve the controlled system (1) and the dominions associated with it. The next result provides such a necessary condition. It is based on the very simple idea that a player will leverage one of his dominion if the payoff is more favorable on this dominion than in the rest of the states.
Let us recall that the state space is essentially the n-torus R n /Z n . However, the image of a closed set in R n /Z n is not necessarily closed, which is problematic when considering dominions. To illustrate this issue, think of the dominions V 1 µ and V 2 ν described in Example 4.5 when µ or ν are irrational, i.e., when their image in R 2 /Z 2 is dense. For this reason, we introduce the following definition of "dominion in the torus". Note that we let π : R n → R n /Z n be the quotient map.
Definition 5.2 (Dominion in the torus
is also a dominion in R n (more generally, thanks to (8), if a set is approximately invariant, then so is its closure). Furthermore, the latter set is Z n -translation-invariant, meaning that for every x ∈ π −1 π(D) and every k ∈ Z n , we have x + k ∈ π −1 π(D) .
We can now state a necessary condition of unique ergodicity involving dominions in the torus.
Proposition 5.3. If the differential game Γ − is uniquely ergodic, then the intersection of every dominion of player 1 with every dominion of player 2 in the torus is nonempty, that is, for every dominion D 1 of player 1 and every dominion D 2 of player 2 in R n , we have
Proof. We prove the contrapositive and, to this end, we suppose that there exist in R n a dominion of player 1, D 1 , and a dominion of player 2,
Since the sets π −1 π(D 1\2 ) are also dominions in R n , we can assume without loss of generality that D 1\2 are Z n -translation-invariant and that
where M ℓ equals ℓ ∞ if ℓ = 0 and any positive real otherwise. Thus, the function g satisfies, for all x ∈ R n ,
Let δ ∈ (0, 1) be any discount factor. From the above inequalities, we deduce that for all x ∈ R n , all strategies α of player 1 and all controls b of player 2,
Let us denote by v g δ the unnormalized value of the discounted game with the perturbed running payoff (x, a, b) → ℓ(x, a, b) + g(x). Taking the supremum over b ∈ B and then the infimum over α ∈ A in the latter inequalities, we deduce from Lemma 4.6 that δv
M ℓ for all x ∈ D 1 , and from Lemma 4.7 that 2M ℓ δv g δ (y) for all y ∈ D 2 . Thus, if x ∈ D 1 and y ∈ D 2 , we have
which proves that the perturbed game is not ergodic, hence that Γ − is not uniquely ergodic.
Remark 5.4 (Comparison with one-player controlled systems). It is instructive to compare the latter necessary condition of unique ergodicity with the result of Arisawa in [Ari97] , which deals with optimal control problems, i.e., problems for systems controlled by one player (who is minimizing and which we call player 1). In this paper, she proved that if the controlled system is uniquely ergodic, then there exists an ergodic attractor D which satisfies the following properties. For such controlled systems, if we introduce a second player as a dummy to cast the problem within the framework of two-player differential games, then it readily follows from the definition that the dominions of player 2 correspond to the nonempty closed and positively invariant sets (indeed, every positive orbit through any point in a dominion of player 2 is within any ε-neighborhood of the dominion for any arbitrary period of time). Let us observe that these sets are also dominions of player 1 and that the intersection of two dominions of player 2, if nonempty, is another dominion of player 2.
Then, applying Proposition 5.3, we deduce that if unique ergodicity holds, there is a unique minimal nonempty closed positively invariant set in the torus and that this set intersect every dominion of player 1 in the torus. We claim that this set is the ergodic attractor D described in [Ari97] and that the two results are equivalent. Indeed it follows from the properties (P) and (D) that the ergodic attractor D is the unique minimal dominion of player 2 (the uniqueness comes from the connectedness in (P) and the minimality from (D)) and property (A) implies that any dominion of player 1 cannot be disjoint from D. Conversely, if D is the unique minimal dominion of player 2 whose existence stems from Proposition 5.3, then property (P) is readily verified. Furthermore, its minimality implies that any point x ∈ D is approximately controllable to any other point y ∈ D. Then, since every dominion of player 1 meets D, and particularly the closure of any positive orbit, we can show that property (D) holds. Finally using (P) and (D) we can then prove that (A) holds, as is done in [Ari97] .
5.2. Sufficient condition via PDE approach. In this subsection, we give a sufficient condition of unique ergodicity which is derived from Theorem 3.2. We start with a lemma that relates the solutions of (HJ ∞ ) to dominions.
Lemma 5.5. Let w be any continuous viscosity solution of (HJ ∞ ). Then arg min w is a dominion of player 1 and arg max w is a dominion of player 2.
Proof. Let us first consider the differential game with the same definition as Γ − except for the payoff function ℓ which is replaced with w. The Hamiltonian associated to this game is H ∞ (x, p) − w(x) and since, for any δ > 0, the function δ −1 w is solution to (HJ δ ) with the latter Hamiltonian, we deduce from Theorem 2.2 that it is the (unnormalized) value of the infinite-horizon discounted game. Thus, for all points x in R n and all positive factors δ we have Now set D = arg min w and let us assume, without loss of generality, that min w = 0. Also, since the case with w constant is trivial, we can assume that D = R n . In view of Lemma 4.6, we fix arbitrary positive constants ε and δ. Again,
ε} is the whole space R n , then the equality in Lemma 4.6 trivially holds, so we assume that ε is small enough so that D ε = R n . Then, denoting by m ε the infimum of w on the complement of D ε , which is necessarily positive, we can write
for all x ∈ R n . By plugging this inequality into the right-hand side of (14), we obtain for all x ∈ R n w(x) inf
After simplification, this yields, for all x ∈ D,
Since the converse inequality is obviously true, we deduce that there is in fact equality and thus, by Lemma 4.6, that D is a dominion of player 1. With very similar arguments and using Lemma 4.7 instead of Lemma 4.6, we can show that arg max w is a dominion of player 2.
We know that if the value function δv δ converges uniformly to some function v then it is solution to (HJ ∞ ). This entails the following corollary Corollary 5.6. Assume that the value function δv δ converges uniformly to some function v. Then arg min v and arg max v are dominions of player 1 and player 2, respectively.
A straightforward consequence is that if arg min v and arg max v have a nonempty intersection, then v is constant and the game is ergodic. We can extend this result to unique ergodicity with the help of Theorem 3.2 and thus provide a converse to Proposition 5.3.
Theorem 5.7. Assume that in the differential game Γ − , the intersection of every dominion of player 1 with every dominion of player 2 in the torus is nonempty. Then the strong maximum principle (see Theorem 3.2) holds, i.e., the constant functions are the only solutions of (HJ ∞ ).
If, moreover, the structural equicontinuity property is true, then Γ − is uniquely ergodic if and only if the two players do not have disjoint dominions in R n /Z n .
Proof. Let w be any solution of (HJ ∞ ). Let D 1 = arg min w and D 2 = arg max w. Since w is Z n -periodic and continuous, it passes to the quotient into a continuous map on the torus whose minimum (resp., maximum) is attained on π(D 1 ) (resp., π(D 2 )). Hence, π(D 1\2 ) are necessarily closed and we have
Using now Lemma 5.5, we deduce that
The rest of the proof follows from Proposition 5.3 and Theorem 3.2.
Note that if the controlled system (1) is Lipschitz continuous, meaning that there is a positive constant L for which
n , ∀a ∈ A, ∀b ∈ B, ∀t 0, then the family {δv δ } is equi-Lipschitz for any payoff function ℓ. In that case we can use the latter theorem to characterize unique ergodicity in terms of dominions. This is in particular the case if the function f does not depend on the state variable. Example 5.8. Let us go back to the game introduced in Examples 3.4 and 4.5, whose dynamics is defined in R 2 by the function
with 0 < γ 1 and whose payoff function ℓ is any function satisfying Assumption A 0 . We already mentioned the family of value functions {δv δ } 0<δ 1 is equicontinuous (see Example 3.6 or the above remark). Hence the structural equicontinuity property holds.
If γ is a rational number then, for any x, y ∈ R 2 , the lines
are dominions of player 1 and player 2, respectively, and their quotient images in the torus R 2 /Z 2 are closed and disjoint for suitable x and y. Thus, according to Theorem 5.7, the game is not uniquely ergodic.
Assume now that γ is not a rational number and consider in R 2 any dominions D 1 and D 2 of player 1 and player 2, respectively. We next show that their intersection in the torus is not empty. Let us fix two points, x ∈ D 1 and y ∈ D 2 , in these dominions. By definition, given ε > 0 and T > 0, player 1 has a strategy α ε ∈ A such that for every action b ∈ B of player 2, we have dist
ε for all t ∈ [0, T ]. In particular, if b is the constant control equal to 1, then we have
that is, the (continuous) trajectory of the dynamical system has the property that X is included in the cone C 1 γ = {z = (z 1 , z 2 ) ⊺ ∈ R 2 | −z 2 γz 1 z 2 } for all 0 s t T (see Figure 1) . Likewise, with the same ε and T , player 2 has a strategy β ε ∈ B such that dist D 2 (X y,a,βε t ) ε for all t ∈ [0, T ] and all a ∈ A, and if player 1 chooses the constant control equal to 1, then we have
that is, the trajectory of the system is such that X y,a,βε t − X y,a,βε s is included in the cone C 2 γ = {z = (z 1 , z 2 ) ⊺ ∈ R 2 | −γz 1 z 2 γz 1 } for all 0 s t T (see Figure 1) . Then, the parameter ε being fixed, either there is some time T such that the images in the torus R 2 /Z 2 of the two trajectories mentioned above intersect on the time interval [0, T ] at some point z ε ∈ R 2 /Z 2 , or for all times T their images always remain disjoint, which is possible only if they are contained in the parallel halflines starting in x and y, respectively, and directed by the vector (1, γ) ⊺ . Indeed, since γ / ∈ Q, the images of these half-lines in the torus are dense, and therefore any deviation of a trajectory from one of these half-lines eventually leads to the intersection of the two trajectories.
If there are only finitely many points z ε as described above, then we deduce that D 1 and D 2 respectively contain the latter half-lines and therefore both dominions correspond to the trivial dominion in R 2 /Z 2 , composed of the whole state space. If there are infinitely many points z ε , then any limit point is, by construction, contained in both D 1 and D 2 . In any case, we deduce that the players do not have disjoint dominions in the torus and so, according to Theorem 5.7, that the game is uniquely ergodic.
5.3. Sufficient condition via controllability approach. We assume in this section that the controlled system (1) is not Lipschitz continuous (and in particular that L f > 0), so that equicontinuity of {δv δ } cannot be guaranteed. We also make the standard assumption that the payoff function ℓ is Lipschitz continuous in x uniformly in (a, b), i.e., that there exists L ℓ > 0 such that |ℓ(x, a, b) − ℓ(y, a, b)| L ℓ |x − y| , ∀x, y ∈ R n , ∀a ∈ A, ∀b ∈ B.
We then have the following classical regularity property of the value function.
Proposition 5.9. If ℓ is Lipschitz continuous in x uniformly in (a, b), then, for any discount factor δ < L f , the value function δv δ is Hölder continuous with exponent δ/L f and constant L independent of δ:
In view of unique ergodicity, the requirement that ℓ be uniformly Lipschitz continuous in x prevents us from considering any perturbation g ∈ C 0 per (R n ) of the payoff function. If we want to use the latter result (which we need to prove the main theorem of this section), we are bound to consider only perturbations g : R n → R that are Lipschitz continuous and Z n -periodic. Fortunately, this is not a major restriction. Indeed, in the proof of Proposition 5.3 it is possible to consider a perturbation function g satisfying (13) which is Lipschitz. Thus we have the following stronger result.
Proposition 5.10. Assume that for every Lipschitz continuous and Z n -periodic function g : R n → R, the perturbed differential game with payoff function (x, a, b) → ℓ(x, a, b) + g(x) is ergodic. Then the players do not have disjoint dominions in R n /Z n .
To compensate the lack of equicontinuity of {δv δ } we also need to introduce the following controllability assumption, whose time estimate is borrowed from [Ari98] (see also [Bet05] ).
Assumption A 2 (Uniform time estimate). There exist constants γ ∈ [0, 1) and C > 0 such that, for all ε > 0,
• for all α ∈ A , for all x ∈ R n and all y ∈ R 1 α (x), there is a control b ∈ B and a time t C(− log ε) γ for which y − X x,α,b t ε;
• for all nonanticipating map A → B, α → b α , for all x ∈ R n and all y ∈ R 2 b(·) (x), there is a strategy α ∈ A and a time t C(− log ε) γ for which y − X x,α,bα t ε.
Let us emphasize that the purpose of this assumption is only to provide a uniform bound on the time needed to approximately reach the target points. The fact that the system is qualitatively approximately controlled by one player or the other to these points is a direct consequence of the definition of the reachable sets R 1 α (x) and R 2 b(·) (x). We can now give a condition for the (somewhat modified version of) unique ergodicity of differential games.
Theorem 5.11. For the differential game Γ − , suppose that Assumption A 2 holds and that the payoff function ℓ is Lipschitz continuous in x uniformly in (a, b). The following assertions are equivalent:
(i) for every function ℓ ′ : R n × A × B → R which is Lipschitz continuous in x uniformly in (a, b) and Z n -periodic in x, the modified game with running payoff ℓ ′ is ergodic; (ii) for every Lipschitz continuous and Z n -periodic function g : R n → R, the perturbed game with running payoff (x, a, b) → ℓ(x, a, b) + g(x) is ergodic; (iii) the players do not have disjoint dominions in the torus.
Proof. The implication (i) ⇒ (ii) is trivial and we already know from Proposition 5.10 that (ii) ⇒ (iii). So we only need to prove that (iii) ⇒ (i). And since the payoff function ℓ is arbitrary and assertion (iii) does not depend on it, if we prove that Γ − is ergodic, the result will be true for any other payoff function ℓ ′ . Let δ > 0 be any discount factor and let ε be a fixed positive real. Let x, y be any points in R n . From the dynamic programming principle, there exists a strategy α 1 ∈ A of player 1 (which depends only on δ, ε and x) such that for all times t > 0. Furthermore, the map α → b α can be chosen nonanticipating, as defined in Section 4.3 (indeed, for the controls b α to satisfy these conditions, we can chose them so that v δ (x) − ε J δ (x, α, b α ). Let D 1 = R 1 α 1 (x) and D 2 = R 2 b(·) (y) be the closures of the sets of reachable points from x and y by player 2 and player 1, respectively, being fixed the strategy α 1 and the nonanticipating map α → b α . We know from Lemma 4.9 that these sets are respectively a dominion of player 1 and a dominion of player 2. Hence there exists
